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This is a draft chapter that has been accepted for publication by Edward Elgar Publishing
in the forthcoming book, Elgar Encyclopedia of Environmental Law: Decisionmaking in
Environmental Law, edited by LeRoy C. Paddock, Robert L. Glicksman, & Nicholas S.
Bryner due to be published in 2016
<entry heading>Introduction
<au>Robert L Glicksman and LeRoy C Paddock
The George Washington University Law School

<a>Abstract
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the growth of environmental law and the
decision making structures that governments have developed to adopt, administer, and enforce it.
It traces the manner in which cooperative federalism and public participation have affected
decision making structures in environmental law, primarily in the United States. It summarizes
key challenges that policymakers continue to face in designing environmental laws, including
choices on the allocation of authority among different levels of government, the appropriate mix
of regulatory and non-regulatory tools to use in environmental protection initiatives, efforts to
accommodate environmental protection and economic growth objectives, techniques to spur
useful government action in the face of political stalemates, balancing the benefits of public
participation with the potential for participatory procedures to slow or derail the implementation
of environmental laws, and determining the role of judicial review. The chapter concludes with a
road map of the all of the other chapters in the book.
<a>Contents
1.1 The birth of modern environmental law
1.2 Cooperative federalism in environmental law
1.3 Public participation
1.4 The challenges of environmental decision making by governments
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1.5 Chapter summaries
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<a>1.1 The birth of modern environmental law
This introductory chapter focuses on the development of environmental law and associated
decision making processes in the United States because the country pioneered many of the
decision making processes that are now common around the world. The US system is also
particularly informative because the federalism issues in the US, which result in a complicated
set of interactions among various levels of government, are now shared by other federal
countries, such as Brazil, and are present in the relationship between law making at the European
Union level and within the nations that make up the EU. By understanding the structure and
processes of US environmental law, the reader should gain a broad understanding of the critical
steps in, and the complexity of, environmental decision making that will then be explored in
more detail in the individual chapters.
Environmental laws can be traced back centuries, certainly as early as the first century
AD in Roman law. The Justinian Institutes in 535 AD provided that ‘by the law of nature these
things are common to all mankind: the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of
the sea’. Smoke abatement ordinances appeared as early as the thirteenth century in London.1
However, what we now consider modern environmental law first developed in the United States
in the 1960s and 1970s. Before that time, environmental law in the United States was largely a
product of state and local action. Rudimentary local ordinances to abate air pollution problems
such as smoke emerged as early as the 1800s.2 But the predominant mechanism for halting
pollution and other commercial and industrial activity that posed threats to health and property
throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century was a common law
action seeking abatement of the offending activity or damages to compensate for harms resulting
from it. The principal theories used to halt environmentally damaging conduct were nuisance

1
2

Glicksman et al (2015) 432.
Andreen (2012) 640–41.
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(both public and private), trespass, negligence, and, in limited contexts, strict liability for
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities. In the United States, which developed these
theories based on decisions by the British courts, common law doctrines were almost entirely the
province of the state courts. As a result, although the doctrines tended to develop in similar ways
throughout the country, each state’s courts were free to adjust the doctrines to meet local needs
and conditions. The same was true of the ordinances and statutes adopted by state and local
legislatures.
The federal government’s role in the development of environmental law dates to early
statutes such as the River and Harbors Act of 1899.3 Although that law was principally a
navigation protection device, the United States Supreme Court interpreted it decades later to also
restrict discharges of water pollution.4 Congress adopted legislation in 1948 that authorized
investigations by federal officials into the consequences of water pollution, provided grants to
state and local agencies to construct sewage treatment plants, and declared interstate water
pollution to be a nuisance.5 Federal air pollution legislation followed a similar pattern. Statutes
passed in 1955 and 1960 authorized a federal program of research and technical assistance on the
causes and effects of air pollution. A 1963 law authorized a federal agency to provide the states
with scientific information on the effects of different air pollutants. Gradually, the federal role
expanded and became more substantive. The 1963 statute authorized enforcement proceedings
against those who emitted air pollution that endangered health or welfare, although no effective
enforcement occurred due to a diffusion of responsibility. In 1965, Congress authorized the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish air pollution emission standards for
new motor vehicles. Two years later, Congress ordered the states to adopt ambient air quality
standards, subject to federal agency approval, and plans specifying emission limits for individual
sources needed to achieve the standards.6
This activity was merely a prelude to the adoption of a series of statutes beginning in
1969 that transformed the landscape of environmental law in the United States, greatly
3

Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, Act of 3 March 1899, 30 Stat 1151.
See, eg, United States v Standard Oil Co, 384 US 224 (1966); United States v Republic Steel
Corp, 362 US 482 (1960).
5
Glicksman et al (2015) 609.
6
ibid 432–33.
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expanding its scope as well as the federal government’s role in implementing the new legislation.
Whereas before 1970, the federal government’s footprint tended to be ‘sporadic and relatively
minor’,7 after 1970 its presence was pervasive. Congress kicked off what became known as ‘the
environmental decade’ by enacting the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).8 That statute
is perhaps the most widely emulated environmental statute in the world, providing a model for
similar legislation elsewhere. NEPA was designed to force federal agencies otherwise inclined to
ignore the environmental consequences of their actions to consider and disclose those
consequences. It requires agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement for every major
federal action that significantly affects the quality of the human environment that details the
potential environmental impacts of proposed action as well as available alternatives that would
reduce those impacts.9 NEPA declares a national policy of encouraging productive harmony
between humans and the environment and of promoting efforts to prevent or eliminate
environmental damage.10 The statute’s lack of substantive content limits its ability to force
environmentally beneficial decisions. The judicial enforceability of NEPA’s procedural duties
(and the fear of delays in favoured agency projects) nevertheless has forced agencies to identify
environmental risks and consider less environmentally damaging alternatives.
The enactment of NEPA, and the policies it announced, symbolized a heightened
commitment on the part of the federal government to lead the effort to protect the environment.
NEPA applied only to actions undertaken by agencies of the federal government. Beginning in
1970, however, Congress in short order passed broader laws that addressed air,11 water,12 and
land pollution.13 These new initiatives were not confined to anti-pollution efforts. In 1972,
Congress adopted the Endangered Species Act,14 which authorizes two federal agencies to list
terrestrial and aquatic species as endangered or threatened, prohibits federal agencies from
engaging in action that jeopardizes listed species or adversely affects their critical habitat, and
Andreen (2012) 651, 658 (referring to ‘a major expansion of federal authority’ in controlling air
pollution).
8
Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 852 (1970).
9
42 USC s 4332(2)(C).
10
42 USC s 4321.
11
Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676.
12
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 817.
13
Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub L No 94-580, 90 Stat 2796 (1976).
14
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-205, 81 Stat 884.
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bars both federal agencies and private individuals from ‘taking’ listed species members.15
Congress also enacted legislation to protect specific species, such as marine mammals,16 wild
horses and burros,17 and ocean fisheries.18 It also passed legislation to govern the management of
lands owned by the federal government, administered by agencies such as the US Forest Service
within the Department of Agriculture19 and the Bureau of Land Management within the Interior
Department.20 Congress capped the environmental decade by enacting the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,21 also known as the ‘Superfund’ law.
This statute authorizes the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which President
Richard Nixon had created in 1970, to clean up releases of hazardous substances and then
recover its costs through litigation against responsible parties, such as facility owners and
operators and generators of wastes disposed of at facilities at which releases later occur.22
<a>1.2. Cooperative federalism in environmental law
In each of these statutes, Congress delegated to federal agencies, including EPA, the power to
implement and enforce the new laws. The creation of new federal agencies and the expansion of
the authority of existing agencies however, did not divest the states of their role in protecting the
environment. Instead, many of the federal environmental laws adopted in the 1970s—principally
those aimed at controlling pollution—reflect a ‘cooperative federalism’ model.23 These laws
create a joint federal-state venture to achieve prescribed environmental protection goals.
Although Congress quite clearly made EPA the dominant partner under laws such as the Clean

15

16 USC ss 1533, 1536(b), 1538(a)(1)(B).
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 USC ss 1461 to 1407.
17
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 USC ss 1331 to 1340.
18
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 USC ss 1801 to 1822.
19
National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-588, 90 Stat 2949.
20
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-579, 90 Stat 2743.
21
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability of 1980, Pub L No 96510, 94 Stat 2767.
22
42 USC ss 9604(a), 9607(a).
23
For discussion of cooperative federalism in US environmental law, see Glicksman (2006); see
also Robbins (2015).
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Air Act and the Clean Water Act,24 it chose to preserve a significant role for the states in making
certain policy choices and performing certain tasks.25
The allocation of authority between EPA and the states under the Clean Air Act is
representative of the US cooperative federalism model. Congress adopted national policies,
including the protection and enhancement of air quality,26 and delegated to EPA the power to
adopt national ambient air quality standards whose function is to protect the public health and
welfare.27 The statute assigns to each state the responsibility of formulating plans that limit
emissions from individual sources within the state to an extent sufficient to achieve and maintain
the standards.28 Within boundaries set by Federal law, the states have discretion to allocate
emission control responsibilities in ways consistent with their own environmental, economic, and
social policies, provided the plan meets minimum federal standards.29 EPA has the authority to
review state plans, and may adopt a federal plan for any state that fails to submit an adequate
plan.30 The states and EPA share enforcement authority so that the federal government may
enforce state emissions limits even if the state does not.31 States also may adopt permit programs
to help administer their plans and implement other statutory programs. EPA may reject
inadequate state permit programs and administer federal programs in delinquent states,32
although EPA clearly never had the resources to issue permits in all but a few states. Congress
vested in EPA the authority to adopt nationally applicable emission standards for certain source
categories, such as new stationary sources,33 sources of hazardous air pollutants,34 and new

See Andreen (2012) 629 (‘EPA was clearly the senior partner’ under the Clean Air Act);
Andreen (2009) 258–59 (referring to EPA as ‘the senior partner in most aspects of the
relationship’ between it and the states under the Clean Water Act).
25
For discussion of the reasons for Congress’s expansion of federal environmental regulatory
authority, see Glicksman and Levy (2008) 591–616 (discussing collective action rationales for
federal environmental regulation).
26
42 USC s 7401(b).
27
ibid s 7409(b).
28
ibid s 7410.
29
Train v Natural Res Def Council, Inc, 421 US 60, 79 (1975).
30
42 USC s 7410(c), (k).
31
ibid s 7413.
32
ibid ss 7661–7661f.
33
ibid s7411.
34
ibid s 7412.
24
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motor vehicles,35 but, for the most part, the states retain the power to adopt standards that are
more stringent than EPA’s.36
The Clean Water Act similarly divides up authority between EPA and the states. Under
that statute, EPA has the power to establish nationally applicable emission standards for point
sources of water pollution based on the best available technology for point source categories.37
States must adopt and submit for EPA review water quality standards, with EPA deciding
whether they are sufficient to promote federal goals, such as the achievement of fishableswimmable water quality.38 States apply to EPA for permission to administer the statute’s
program for issuance of discharge permits to individual point sources. EPA must approve state
programs that meet mandatory statutory requirements, but it may veto individual state permits
and withdraw authorization of entire programs if states do not properly implement them.39 EPA
issues permits in states without approved programs. As under the Clean Air Act, EPA and the
states share enforcement authority.40 States are free to adopt effluent limitations or standards that
are more stringent than those adopted by EPA.41
Not all of the environmental statutes that originated during the environmental decade
were built on a cooperative federalism foundation. The Toxic Substances Control Act,42 which
creates testing and pre-market review requirements for chemical substances, and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),43 which
establishes liability for disposal of hazardous wastes and procedures for cleaning up old
hazardous waste sites, are administered by EPA without significant participation by state
agencies. Similarly, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),44 which
requires federal registration prior to the marketing or use of chemical insecticides and herbicides,
is largely a federal program, although states participate in enforcement of FIFRA’s mandates.
35

ibid ss 7507, 7521(a), 7543.
ibid s 7416.
37
33 USC ss 1311(b), 1314(b).
38
ibid ss 1251(a), 1313(c).
39
ibid s 1342(b)–(d).
40
ibid s 1319.
41
ibid s 1370.
42
15 USC ss 2601–2629.
43
42 USC ss 9601–9675.
44
7 USC ss 136–136y.
36
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The statutes that govern management of the lands and resources owned by the federal
government also vest in the federal land management agencies control over most management
policy choices, with input in some instances from state and local governments, but without the
kind of significant delegation of administrative responsibilities to those entities that characterize
the cooperative federalism-based pollution statutes.45
The enactment of this vast body of administrative law beginning in the 1970s reflected
Congress’s perception that state law, including state common law tort claims for environmental
injuries, had not proved adequate to the task of improving key aspects of environmental quality.
One of the main reasons why the common law gave way to a more complex body of statutory or
regulatory law was its essentially reactive nature; common law tort actions tend to be more
effective at redressing harm through monetary compensation after the fact than at preventing
such harm from occurring in the first place. In addition, agencies’ greater expertise made them
better situated than courts to devise solutions to the increasingly complex environmental
problems, as the courts themselves have recognized.46 Despite the creation of a litany of statutes
addressing a broad array of environmental problems, each of which generated a substantial body
of regulatory law administered by federal and state agencies, Congress chose not to completely
displace common law remedies for environmental harm. Instead, in almost all of the pollution
control statutes, it included ‘savings clauses’ that preserve these remedies.47
<a>1.3 Public participation
The shift of the locus of power to adopt and implement environmental law from state and local
governments to the federal government, and from courts to agencies, was one of the defining
characteristics of the environmental legislation adopted by the US Congress in the 1970s.
Another groundbreaking development was the enhancement of opportunities for public
participation in the environmental lawmaking process. The expanded array of participatory

45

For discussion of federalism issues in public natural resources law, see Fischman (2005);
Fischman and King (2007); Fischman and Williamson (2011).
46
See, eg, Am Elec Power Co v Connecticut, 131 S Ct 2527 (2011).
47
See, eg, 33 USC s 1365(e) (Clean Water Act); 42 USC s 6972(f) (Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act); 42 USC s 7604(e) (Clean Air Act). The enactment of federal statutes may
displace federal common law even if it does not preempt state common law. See Am Elec Power
Co v Connecticut, 131 S Ct 2527 (2011).
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opportunities took several forms. Since the late 1940s, the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) has provided members of the public a right to petition an agency for issuance of
regulations.48 Agencies such as EPA have created regulatory procedures for doing so, and citizen
rulemaking petitions have prompted the adoption of significant new rules, such as those
establishing emission limits on greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles.49 The APA provided
other opportunities for public participation in agency rulemaking proceedings, most prominently
in requiring agencies to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking and provide an opportunity for
public comment prior to adoption of a final rule.50 Statutes such as the Clean Air Act51 and the
Toxic Substances Control Act52 create even greater participatory rights in rulemaking
proceedings.
Similar opportunities exist under other US environmental laws. For example, regulations
issued by the Council on Environmental Quality, the agency responsible for supervising
compliance with NEPA,53 require an agency proposing to take a major federal action with
significant environmental impacts to prepare a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) and
solicit comments from other federal agencies with expertise, state and local agencies, Native
American tribes, and interested members of the public before issuing a final EIS.54 Under the
Endangered Species Act, the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries
Service must provide an opportunity for public comment before deciding whether to issue a
permit authorizing the incidental take of listed species.55
While APA-based participation provided new opportunities for citizen engagement, these
procedures have more recently been criticized as ‘too little, too late’. A substantial literature
exists discussing the need to provide the public with earlier notice of agency actions and more
frequent opportunities to participate in the decision making process.56 EPA’s ‘Public

48

5 USC s 553(e).
See Massachusetts v EPA, 549 US 497 (2007).
50
5 USC s 553(b)–(c).
51
42 USC s 7607(d).
52
15 USC s 2605(c)(2)–(3).
53
42 USC s 4344.
54
40 CFR s 1503.1.
55
16 USC s1539(a)(2)(B).
56
See King (1998) 317; Paddock (2004) 255–60.
49
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Involvement Policy’57 adopted in 2003 sets out a comprehensive set of steps designed to assure
earlier and more complete opportunities to participate, but it is only a policy and not legally
binding. Early and effective public involvement procedures are a critical element of assuring
environmental justice.58
The most innovative form of public participation created by US environmental law—also
emulated widely in other countries’ environmental laws—is the citizen suit mechanism. As one
scholar has put it, ‘[p]erhaps the most pervasive, prominent, and continuing innovation in the
modern environmental era has been the involvement of citizens in the enforcement of
environmental laws.’59 Following a model advocated in scholarship by pioneering environmental
law professor Joseph Sax60 and incorporated into early state environmental legislation in
Michigan and Minnesota, Congress included a citizen suit provision in most of the pollution
control statutes61 and the Endangered Species Act.62 These provisions allow two kinds of suits.
First, they authorize any person able to meet jurisdictional requirements, such as standing to sue
to bring an action in federal court, against any person alleged to be in violation of any statutory,
regulatory, or permit requirement. This citizen enforcement mechanism is designed partly to
provide a backstop in case neither the federal government nor the state in which the violation
occurs has pursued appropriate enforcement. Citizens have been particularly active in enforcing
regulatory requirements, such as discharge limits in Clean Water Act permits, under statutes that
make important compliance-related documents publicly available. Second, they allow citizens to
sue agencies such as EPA or the agencies that implement the Endangered Species Act to force
them to take nondiscretionary actions (such as the issuance of regulations) mandated by statute.
This mechanism provides a safeguard against failure to abide by statutory responsibilities
through inaction driven by agency capture or resource shortages. Citizen suits of this second kind
have been important in prompting important policy initiatives, such as the adoption of total
US EPA, ‘Introducing EPA’s Public Involvement Policy’ (2003), available at
<http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/100045RR.PDF?Dockey=100045RR.PDF> accessed 15
Jan 2016.
58
See Chapter __ (Paddock Environmental Justice chapter).
59
Thompson (2000).
60
See Sax (1971).
61
eg 33 USC s 1365 (Clean Water Act); 42 USC s 6972 (Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act); 42 USC s 7604 (Clean Air Act).
62
16 USC s 1540(g).
57
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maximum daily loads under the Clean Water Act.63 These citizen suit opportunities exist on top
of more traditional avenues for judicial review of agency actions, such as suits challenging the
issuance of agency regulations or permits.
<a>1.4 The challenges of environmental decision making by governments
Modern environmental law is approaching the end of its fifth decade. In many countries, this
body of law has done a great deal to reduce health risks and to bolster protection of biodiversity
linked to pollution, land development, and other environmentally damaging activity. Yet,
considerable challenges remain; statutory goals, such as air quality sufficient to protect public
health and water quality that is suitable for drinking and recreational use, remain unachieved
aspirations, at least in some places. Both acute and chronic air pollution problems are evident in
many areas around the world, some of which are subject to rudimentary or unenforced
environmental laws. Even in developed nations of the West, where environmental law has the
oldest and strongest pedigree, the promise of environmental law has not yet been fully achieved.
The challenges with which policymakers are grappling and will continue to confront in designing
environmental protection programs include how to allocate authority among different levels of
government; what mix of regulatory and non-regulatory tools to rely on in seeking higher levels
of environmental protection; how best to accommodate both environmental protection and
economic growth objectives; how to spur useful government action in the face of political
stalemates; how to balance the benefits of public participation with the potential for participatory
procedures to slow or derail implementation of environmental laws; and determining the role of
judicial review.
As indicated above, the US environmental legislation adopted beginning in the 1970s
shifted the balance of policymaking authority from the states to the federal government, while
reserving important roles for the states under the cooperative federalism model. The choices
reflected in that legislation, however, were controversial at the time they were made and continue
to generate debate. Courts, on occasion, have invalidated US environmental legislation that was
insufficiently respectful of state sovereignty.64 They have construed the scope of federal
See generally Glicksman (2004). The article is part of a symposium on ‘Environmental Citizen
Suits at Thirtysomething’.
64
See, eg, New York v United States, 505 US 144 (1992).
63
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regulatory authority narrowly to avoid raising constitutional federalism questions.65 Scholars
question whether a major federal role was ever necessary or whether it is time to enhance the
role of the states,66 some of which have been innovators in dealing with problems such as climate
change.67 Difficult questions concerning the appropriate allocation of authority among different
levels of government will continue to confront policymakers, particularly in countries with a
federal structure of government.
Another ongoing debate concerns the selection of tools to pursue environmental
protection goals. In the early years of environmental regulation, regulatory strategies tended to
focus on what are now referred to as traditional regulatory techniques such as establishing
emission or discharge limits for individual sources. These tended to take the form, in the United
States, of performance standards, which establish a required level of emissions reduction or
specified a maximum level of emissions discharges (often in the form of a numerical limit), but
leave regulated entities free to choose the method of achieving that level. The rationale for
relying on performance standards is that regulated entities have continued incentives to seek the
least costly means of reaching the required performance level. Less frequently, regulatory
programs rely on design standards, which dictate not only the level but the method of
performance. In the United States, some of the performance standards, such as effluent limits
under the Clean Water Act, became de facto design standards, as companies choose simply to
adopt the reference technology for the performance standard rather than try to establish that
another technology meets the required level of performance. Rather than driving technology
innovation, as the drafters of the Clean Water Act had planned, this conservative approach by
facility operators has tended to freeze old technology in place because the underlying
performance standards were not regularly updated.
Economists urged regulators to incorporate into environmental law techniques that mimic
markets, arguing that doing so would improve the efficiency of regulatory compliance without
sacrificing environmental quality. Although many economists favoured the adoption of pollution
taxes, policymakers, for political reasons, often preferred other incentive-based techniques, such
65

See, eg, Rapanos v United States, 547 US 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N Cook County v
US Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 US 159 (2001).
66
See, eg, Adler (2005); Adler (2007).
67
See, eg, Markell (1994).
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as marketable permits. Those programs created the potential for those with relatively low costs
of control to do better than their regulatory obligations in order to generate ‘allowances’ that
could then be sold (at a profit) to others with higher control costs. The upshot would be lower
total expenditures to achieve the same aggregate level of environmental performance. In the
United States, EPA experimented with different versions of emissions trading68 before Congress
adopted the first large-scale cap-and-trade program as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.69 This program was designed to abate acid rain in the eastern half of the country.
The acid rain cap and trade program proved very effective in reducing pollution at a much lower
than anticipated cost. However, the acid rain trading system is rather unique in that it only
applies to about 200 electric power plants, all of which are required to have continuous emissions
monitors and report sulphur dioxide emissions to EPA in real time. Most other trading schemes
involve more complex and less homogeneous settings.
Still, based in part on the success of this program in improving environmental quality at a
lower cost than traditional regulation would have required, other nations and international
agreements have expanded the use of incentive-based techniques such as cap-and-trade
programs, which often work in conjunction with more traditional regulatory programs. One
example is the Kyoto Protocol’s program for reducing greenhouse gases that contribute to
climate change.70 Notwithstanding the expansion of non-traditional regulatory techniques, they
remain controversial, at least in some contexts. Among the concerns are the possibility that
environmental markets are subject to manipulation, just as stock and commodities markets are.71
As a result, policymakers continue to struggle with whether to rely on market-based regulatory
options, and, if so, how to design them in ways likely to minimize efforts to undermine their
efficacy in achieving the government’s regulatory goals.
Some scholars and policymakers support even greater movement away from traditional
regulatory mechanisms. Some urge greater use of information disclosure in lieu of regulation, in

68

See, eg, Chevron USA Inc v Natural Res Def Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984) (upholding
EPA’s approval of the ‘bubble’ concept, a form of internal emissions trading).
69
42 USC ss 7651–7651o.
70
Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2303 UNTS 148
(1997); Glicksman and others (2015) 1279–91.
71
See, eg, Glicksman (2014).
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the hope that those creating health or environmental risks will choose to minimize the extent to
which they create them to avoid adverse reactions from consumers and investors.72 The US
Congress has relied on information disclosure to promote environmental goals in statutes such as
NEPA and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.73 Other scholars urge
greater reliance on government-private partnerships or voluntary actions by business in light of
the failures of some regulatory programs74 and the limited resources available to oversight
agencies. These debates over the proper roles of the public and private sector will continue to
arise in many contexts. One interesting new development has been the adoption by many
companies of sustainability goals and the related use of environmental supply chain
requirements. These goals and requirements sometimes address regulatory requirements, but they
also can reach beyond legal requirements to deal with issues such as energy efficiency that are
not currently regulated.75
A third area of recurrent controversy and litigation is the manner in which the economic
impact of environmental regulations should affect the identification and pursuit of environmental
protection goals. To some observers, environmental protection laws inevitably impair economic
growth, as costly compliance obligations cause job losses or prevent job creation. A frequent
argument made in the United States and elsewhere is that unilateral adoption by one nation of
stringent environmental regulations reduces the competitiveness of domestic businesses with
firms in countries with less protective regimes and drives domestic businesses offshore. Others
reject this antagonistic characterization. They respond that environmental protection and
economic prosperity go hand in hand because, for example, environmental protection laws result
in a healthier and more productive population. In addition, environmental protection laws can
generate new industries, such as the manufacture of pollution control technology, that generate
job growth. Proponents of greenhouse gas emission limitations contend that constraints on
generation of electricity from the combustion of fossil fuels provide an opportunity for domestic
participants in the business of renewable energy development to get a head start on foreign
competitors.

72

See Karkkainen (2001).
42 USC ss 11001–11050.
74
See, eg, Marchant, Sylvester, and Abbott (2010); Freeman and Farber (2005).
75
See Chapter ___ (Light/Vandenbergh chapter).
73
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It is therefore not surprising that one of the most frequent issues in environmental
litigation is whether a particular environmental statute allows or requires the implementing
agency to consider cost as a factor relevant to determining the appropriate level of regulation.76
The battle over how to factor cost considerations into environmental regulatory decisions also
manifests itself in the fierce and ongoing debate over the propriety and utility of using costbenefit analysis to make these decisions.77 A similar dynamic arises in natural resource
management, as policymakers and affected interests battle over how much resource extraction
and commodity use to allow in ecologically important areas.
One of the problems that environmental policymakers have confronted since the
inception of environmental law is the dynamic nature of the problems it addresses and associated
scientific uncertainty. Nature is never static, so environmental regulation is sometimes built on
information, assumptions, or models that quickly become obsolete. The challenge for
policymakers is to design programs that are responsive to current conditions but that also provide
sufficient flexibility to address the issues posed by changed circumstances or newly discovered
problems, such as ozone depletion in the 1980s. This challenge has become particularly critical
in the United States, where environmental law has become politicized to an unprecedented
degree, creating legislative stalemate over almost all environmental issues. Congress has adopted
few significant pieces of environmental legislation over the last 25 years. It has yet to adopt a
comprehensive climate change statute, for example, forcing EPA to confront climate change
under 45-year-old provisions in the Clean Air Act, which was adopted before human
contributions to climate change were widely appreciated. One response has been to urge
policymakers to rely on strategies that accommodate change by experimenting with different
solutions, gathering information on the results, and making necessary adjustments. Adaptive
management is a decision making technique that has been highly touted,78 but that has also raised
concerns about the resulting lack of agency accountability.79

See, eg, Entergy Corp v Riverkeeper, 556 US 208 (2009); Whitman v Am Trucking Ass’ns, Inc,
531 US 457 (2001); Union Elec Co v EPA, 427 US 246 (1976).
77
Compare Livermore (2014); Revesz (2014) with Sinden (2004); McGarity (1998).
78
Craig and Ruhl (2014).
79
See Doremus and others (2011).
76
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Another problem that contributes to the difficulty of nimble responses by government to
emerging environmental problems is the laborious process of adopting agency regulations. Over
the years, the time needed to complete a major rulemaking in the United States has increased
significantly.80 The phenomenon is so widely discussed that it has been given a name—
regulatory ossification.81 To some extent, these delays are intentional; some opponents of
regulation have endorsed regulatory impact analysis requirements that impose burdensome
analytical duties on agencies that are bound to reduce regulatory output.82 But delay is also a byproduct of the proliferation of requirements for agencies to provide opportunities for public
participation. Some have urged reduced participatory requirements in some instances to facilitate
quick agency decision making.83 Debate over how to strike a balance between allowing public
input without shackling agencies is likely to continue, particularly in light of recent evidence that
the participatory process in some instances is dominated by well-heeled regulated entities.84
Finally, the role of the courts in the implementation of environmental law has been
controversial since the inception of modern environmental law. From early on, judges debated
whether they are competent to review the merits of environmental decisions steeped in scientific
evidence, and, even if so, whether they would overstep the appropriate judicial role through
review of the substantive merits of agency decisions on environmental matters.85 That debate has
never abated, and courts, scholars, and policymakers still disagree on the appropriate judicial
role. In the United States, that debate is reflected, for example, in continuing turmoil over the
extent to which courts should defer to agency interpretations of the statutes they administer,86 an
issue which the Supreme Court addressed recently when a divided Court extended that deference
to agency jurisdictional determinations.87 Similarly, some members of the Court have signalled
their amenability to abandoning the traditional posture of deference to agency interpretations of
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their own regulations.88 Judges also differ on when litigants should be afforded access to the
courts through the application of jurisdictional doctrines such as standing, based on disparate
conceptions of the separation of powers and rule of law implications of allowing or not allowing
such access.89
Governmental efforts to address the threats posed by climate change encapsulate the
challenges posed to modern environmental law. The global impact of CO2 and other greenhouse
gas emissions on increasing surface and water temperatures, coupled with the site-specific nature
of climate change effects, such as sea level rise or drought, pose difficult choices in allocating
policymaking authority. Instrument choice has been controversial, as debates over the relative
merits of a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program illustrate. Debate over both the degree of the
environmental threat (if any) posed by climate change and the nature and magnitude of the
economic impact of addressing (or failing to address) it has been heated. The courts have played
an essential role, at least in the United States, endorsing EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions under the Clean Air Act and prompting it to take regulatory action.90 At the same
time, persistent judicial challenges to every significant regulatory action EPA has taken to
address climate change have delayed the implementation of regulatory solutions and created
pervasive uncertainty about the nature of future regulatory obligations for sectors such as the
electric power industry, to the dismay of even some regulated entities. Climate change issues
therefore present a microcosm of environmental law’s most significant challenges, and the
manner in which governments address them will significantly shape the future of government
environmental decision making.
This brief discussion of the issues that nearly fifty years of environmental decision
making by all arms of government have failed to resolve is not meant to be exhaustive. Nor is it
meant to suggest that the same issues will arise in the same ways, if at all, in every country. The
salience of some of the problems referred to here will turn on the nature and structure of
government. Federalism questions, for example, necessarily will be confined to countries with a
federalist system. Other issues, such as the appropriate mechanisms for public participation and
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the role of the courts in reviewing decisions with environmental implications, are likely to be
common to most governmental systems. The function of this book is to provide an entrée into
these kinds of issues, both generally and in the context of the environmental laws of particular
nations.
<a>1.5 Chapter summaries
The chapters in this volume address all of the issues discussed in this introduction as well as
other important aspects of government decision making concerning environmental law. The first
group of chapters deals with the sources of authority to enact and implement environmental law
and the goals of this body of law. Erin Daly and James May provide a chapter that addresses the
increasingly important phenomenon of environmental constitutionalism, which recognizes that
the environment is an appropriate subject for constitutional protection. The chapter explores the
interrelationships between domestic and international environmental protection and surveys the
various provisions found in national constitutions around the globe. International law and
process is the focus of a chapter by Carl Bruch and John Broderick. The authors review the
nature and role of different forms of international law and emphasize four emerging trends in
international environmental law, including globalization, linkages of international environmental
law to other fields, the rise of non-State actors, and greater implementation, compliance, and
enforcement. Karen Morrow’s chapter traces the history of common law nuisance claims in
Great Britain to address environmental problems, highlighting its recent reinvigoration by the
expansion of human rights law. Sandra Zellmer addresses the extent to which, and the issues that
arise when legislatures enact legislation that preempts statutory or common law remedies for
environmental harms by subordinate levels of government or that displace common law remedies
provided by courts at the same level of government. She draws on examples from the United
States, the British Commonwealth countries, Brazil, and Germany. Maria Lee also covers the
intersection between the statutory and regulatory components of environmental law and tort law,
focusing on the manner in which regulatory law contributes to the resolution of tort disputes.
Mary Wood and Gordon Levitt explore the public trust doctrine, which they characterize as a
fundamental precursor to modern environmental law. Their chapter assesses recent judicial
expansions of the doctrine and its potential to protect planetary assets such as the atmosphere.
Kirsten Engel’s chapter considers the emergence of a dynamic model of federalism as it applies
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to environmental law, identifying the tension between rationales for allocating authority among
levels of government in a federalist system that strive for efficiency or for the benefits of
overlapping authority. Guilherme Leal’s chapter covers environmental federalism in Brazil. He
assesses the importance of the 1988 Constitution in setting federalism ground rules, arguing that
it initiated unprecedented engagement by states and municipalities, but that both legal and
political obstacles remain to achieving a smoothly functioning system of environmental
federalism. Local government decision making to protect the environment is the subject to Sean
Nolon’s chapter. The chapter identifies the important functions played by local governments in
regulating land use and development and provides examples of effective local government
approaches to environmental protection.
Another pair of chapters involves administrative procedures that apply to various aspects
of environmental decision making. Jessica Makowiak covers opportunities for public
participation in the European Union, primarily under the Aarhus Convention and implementing
legislation. The chapter by Eric DeGroff investigates the triggers for international development
of laws assuring public access to information, with a focus on the European Union.
Several chapters analyse the choices available to policymakers in identifying
environmental protection goals and in choosing control strategies for pursuing them. John
Dernbach’s chapter explores the goals reflected in environmental laws, both domestic and
international, which bear on not only environmental protection, but also social, economic, and
national security matters. This chapter also analyses translating these broad objectives into
specific goals based on targets and timetables can make environmental law more effective.
William Buzbee explains the richly nuanced strategies reflected in US environmental laws, the
reasons for choosing each of them, and the reliance in many statutes on an integrated mix of
these strategies. Victor Flatt explores market-based (or economic incentive) strategies. He
analyses the theoretical basis for relying on markets to achieve environmental goals and
identifies when such strategies are most and least likely to be appropriate. David Driesen focuses
on a particular form of market-based tools: emissions trading. He identifies the key choices
governments face in designing trading programs at various decision points in seeking to achieve
cost-effective pollution control while avoiding opportunities for evasion and manipulation—
setting a cap, choosing between auctioning and administratively distributing allowances,
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deciding whether to allow trading outside of a cap, and establishing monitoring requirements. A
chapter by Bradley Karkkainen addresses information mandates as a form of environmental
regulation, focusing on three types of stand-alone information production and disclosure
requirements: environmental impact assessment, pollutant release registries, and duties to warn.
Karkkainen provides prominent examples of each technique from both domestic and
international law contexts and assesses the performance of each. Dave Owen addresses the role
of planning in environmental law, its appeal to policymakers, academic criticism of
environmental law’s reliance on planning, and the impact of adaptive management and
technological advances on the value of planning. The chapter by Cary Coglianese and Jennifer
Nash provides an empirical assessment of the value of voluntary programs that seek to motivate
private firms’ environmental protection efforts through positive incentives such as public
recognition and limited regulatory relief. The authors conclude that the most effective voluntary
programs depend on a robust backdrop of community pressure and regulatory threat. The chapter
by Sarah Light and Michael Vandenbergh covers the emergence of private environmental
governance as an important aspect of environmental law, highlighting how programs such as
government-hybrid initiatives and privatization of traditionally public services have both
complemented and competed with positive, public law. Amy Sinden tackles the controversy
surrounding the use of cost-benefit analysis, distinguishing between cost-benefit analysis and
other analytical techniques and among different forms of cost-benefit analysis. She evaluates the
theoretical and practical challenges posed by the use of cost-benefit analysis as an analytical
technique.
A couple of chapters are devoted to environmental review. Daniel Mandelker explores
the main issues arising under the National Environmental Policy Act, the US environmental
impact assessment law on which similar laws across the globe have been modelled. Jessica
Wentz’s chapter discusses how climate change is considered in environmental assessment. She
highlights emerging trends, addressing assessment of both a project’s contribution to climate
change and of how climate change may impact a project or exacerbate environmental risks.
Public engagement issues are addressed in another group of chapters. William Murray
Tabb analyses the growing trend in both national and international environmental law to foster
public engagement at all stages of the decision making process. He traces this trend to pluralistic
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views derived from notions of democratic participation, self-determination, and human rights,
but argues that to date, no unified understanding of precise procedural mechanisms best suited to
fostering public engagement has surfaced. LeRoy Paddock assesses the role of equity by
addressing how environmental justice concerns have been integrated into environmental decision
making by governments. The chapter explains how the concept of environmental justice has
become a global issue relating to human rights protection. Geert Van Hoorick addresses the role
of permitting in environmental law, with a focus on the laws of the European Union. He
discusses permitting’s potential to improve environmental decision making, particularly for large
scale projects. William Andreen’s chapter dissects the allocation of authority among different
levels of government to administer permit programs. He compares and contrasts federal systems
in Australia, Germany, and the United Sates that rely on permitting regimes that run the gamut
from traditional to dynamic, largely using water pollution permitting as an example of the
benefits of overlapping authority.
The final group of chapters engages the topics of access to justice and final decision
making. The chapter by Randolph Hill, Michelle Wenisch, and Suzanne Krolikowski surveys the
process of administrative review, such as internal appeals of agency decisions. The authors rely
on examples from the United States and China to illustrate the role of administrative review in
vindicating notions of justice and due process. Bradford Mank’s chapter investigates the use of
justiciability doctrines such as standing, finality, and ripeness to control access to the courts in
the United States on environmental matters. He identifies ambiguities in existing doctrine and the
potential for judicial manipulation of these critical doctrines that govern access to judicial
remedies. Heather Elliott takes on the approaches different countries have adopted to judicial
review of regulatory agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they administer, exploring the
justifications for and against judicial deference as well as the unpredictability that different
review frameworks may create. Emily Hammond’s chapter investigates judicial review of
environmental decision making, focusing on the nature of science and its use by environmental
regulatory agencies. She explores the limits of the concept of judicial deference to agency
technical expertise and conceptualizes a continuum of deference doctrines, assesses criticisms of
each approach, and recommends a moderate approach. Karl Coplan devotes his chapter to citizen
enforcement, focusing on the citizen suit mechanism pioneered in the United States and on
alternative approaches such as direct citizen prosecution of criminal violations in Canada, and
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citizen enforcement opportunities in China and the European Union. The chapter by Nicholas
Bryner is devoted to discussion of the role of public intervenors and public funding in
environmental decision making. Building from the Rio Declaration’s endorsement of public
participation and effective access to justice, Bryner uses Brazil’s Ministério Público as an
example of an effective public intervenor mechanism and explores public funding models from
Canada and the United States. Izchak Kornfeld addresses the emergence of international courts
as a forum for the resolution of environmental disputes, using the International Court of Justice
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as examples, and endorses the use of ad hoc
arbitration as an international dispute resolution forum. The book closes with a chapter by
George Pring and Catherine Pring on specialty environmental courts and tribunals, evaluating the
arguments for and against such tribunals, the reasons for their emergence, how they differ from
general courts, and the potential advantages they may provide.
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